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made an insurer of his product only to the extent that the plaintiff
was able to establish negligence on the part of the supplier. 9 How-
ever, if the supplier can be found negligent by application of res
ipsa loquitur, the effect is virtually the same as if the assembler-
manufacturer's liability was predicated on implied warranty. Indeed,
the Fifth Circuit might even prefer to ground liability in implied
warranty based on public policy rather than in negligence."0 Should
the Texas Supreme Court accept the Ford Motor Co."' case as per-
suasive, Texas may soon find itself in the growing number of juris-
dictions which accept implied warranty as a theory of recovery for
injuries resulting from defects in manufactured products that are
likely to cause death or serious bodily harm if they fail in their
intended uses.
Scott Morris
Community Property and Life Insurance
Brown v. Lee: Panacea and Problem
I. BACKGROUND
Confusion and uncertainty prevailed in Texas community prop-
erty law because of a persistent theoretical dilemma as to the legal
status of the right to the proceeds, or death benefits, from a life in-
surance policy prior to its maturity.' Fortunately, it had been recog-
" "In the beginning, two things are significant .... The second is that an identifiable
defect in the dimmer switch was established." Id. at 271. "On the basic issue, Texas law
holds the manufacturer-assembler liable for the negligence of its supplier of a component
part." Id. at 276. It is most likely, however, that the assembler-manufacturer will not
have to bear the loss, as "hold safe" contracts often are required of the supplier. Even
without such a contract, the assembler-manufacturer has a cause of action against the
supplier. As between joint tortfeasors, a right of indemnity arises in favor of one who
satisfies an obligation on which he was liable if the actual wrong or the greater culpability
rests on the other joint tortfeasor. Panhandle Gravel Co. v. Wilson, 248 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
" See notes 35-47 supra and accompanying text. In any event, the measure of damages
in negligence and implied warranty cases is, for all practical purposes, the same. Consequential
damages, to the person or to property, are recoverable in either instance. I Frumer &
Friedman, Products Liability § 16.01[2] (1960).
" 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
Originally noticed by Professor William 0. Huie, this dilemma also has been observed
by others. See Hall, Estate Taxation of Life Insurance and Texas Community Property 18-30
(unpublished thesis for LL.M., Southern Methodist University, 1959); Huie, Community
Property and Life Insurance--Substantive Aspects-Developments in Texas, in Texas Insti-
tutes, 2 Business & Family Planning 104 (1957); Huie, Community Property Laws as Ap-
plied to Life Insurance (pts. 1-2), 17 Texas L. Rev. 121 (1939), 18 Texas L. Rev. 121
(1940); Ray, Life Insurance, Community Property, and Death Taxes in Texas, 26 Texas
B.J. 835 (1963); Stephens, Life Insurance and Community Property in Texas-Revisited,
10 Sw. L.J. 343 (1956); Swift, House Bill 900 and Your Life Insurance Policy, 20 Texas
B.J. 691 (1957).
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nized that the various incidents of ownership of a policy prior to
maturity, including the cash surrender value, are vested property
rights." But two diametrically opposed theories existed as to the
nature of the right to the proceeds from a policy prior to maturity.
In at least two significant situations the right to the proceeds from
a policy purchased with community funds had been characterized as
"property."' More frequently, however, the proceeds right was held
to have been transformed into property only upon the maturing of
the policy." Under the latter, "non-property" theory, before maturity
a "Incidents of ownership" or "policy rights" refer generally to the economic benefits of
a life insurance policy other than the right to the proceeds, or death benefits, therefrom.
Among such benefits are the rights to change the beneficiary, to surrender the policy, to as-
sign the policy or to revoke an assignment thereof, to pledge the policy for a loan, and to ob-
tain a loan against the surrender value of the policy from the insurer. Commissioner v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (1958). A series of divorce cases, holding that the wife has
a vested one-half interest in the cash surrender value of a policy purchased with community
funds, best illustrate the vested nature of the various incidents of ownership. Womack v.
Womack, 141 Tex. 299, 172 S.W.2d 307 (1943); Cox v. Cox, 304 S.W.2d 175, 177-78
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Berdoll v. Berdoll, 145 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error
dism.; Locke v. Locke, 143 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940); Russell v. Russell, 79
S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error dism. See also San Jacinto Bldg. v. Brown, 79
S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error ref. (holding in creditors' rights situation that the
cash surrender value was a community asset prior to maturity of policy). Certain taxation
cases are in accord with the divorce cases. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calvert, 301 S.W.2d 496
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (policy rights recognized as community asset; one-half of cash sur-
render value at time of wife's death of community property policies on husband's life in-
cluded in wife's estate for state inheritance tax purposes).
a Use of community funds by husband to insure his life for the benefit of his separate
estate: Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S.W. 904 (1895); determination of
state inheritance tax: Blackmon v. Hansen, 140 Tex. 536, 169 S.W.2d 962 (1943) (proceeds
of policy on husband's life purchased with community funds implicitly treated as community
property, since only one-half of proceeds included in his estate for taxation purposes). See
also Sherman v. Roe, 153 Tex. 1, 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953) (in simultaneous death situation
occurring before enactment of Texas simultaneous death act, see notes 10, 12 infra, pro-
ceeds of policy on husband's life equally divided between spouses' estates on theory that
proceeds became community property under general presumption of community property
in Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960)).
" The prototype Texas case supporting this theory is Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567,
63 S.W. 624 (1901) (husband used community funds to take out policy on wife's life and
named himself beneficiary; proceeds right held to become property only upon wife's death
and to vest at that time in husband in his separate right). See also Warthan v. Haynes, 155
Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956) (see note 7 infra) ; Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hard-
in, 145 Tex. 245, 197 S.W.2d 105 (1946) (wife predeceased husband, who thereafter desig-
nated his sisters as beneficiaries of policies on his life purchased with community funds; after
husband's death, wife's heir held to have no vested right to share in policy proceeds to extent
of one-half of cash surrender value at date of wife's death); Jones v. Jones, 146 S.W. 26S
(Tex. Civ. App. 1912) (non-property character of insurance policy recognized in third
party beneficiary situation).
Since the death of the insured spouse both dissolves the community and matures the
policy and since all effects acquired with community property during marriage are com-
munity property, Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 4619 (1960), apparently under the non-
property theory the insured spouse's death operated to mature the policy at an instant after
it terminated the community itself. Only in this way could the proceeds from the policy
become the beneficiary's separate property directly, instead of the right thereto initially being
community property and thereafter attaining separate ownership status through a completed
gift of that right from the community upon the death of the insured.
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the policy was only "evidence of a contract."' Presumably this view
of life insurance proceeds was grounded in certain pragmatic con-
siderations. A life insurance policy is a unique investment in that its
proceeds right matures only upon the death of the insured spouse-
an event which dissolves the community. Also the rights to change
the beneficiary and to cause the policy to lapse at any time prior to
death normally are retained.
This dichotomy in Texas community property-life insurance law
had endured for more than a half-century." The 1956 non-property
decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Warthan v. Haynes,' how-
ever, aroused the Texas legislature to immediate action on this prob-
lem. In 1957, the statutory definition of "property" was amended
expressly to include "life insurance policies and the effects thereof."'
Although this statute by its own terms clearly overruled the non-
property theory of life insurance proceeds," its legal effect had not
been judicially determined. In brief, this is the setting out of which
the principal case, Brown v. Lee, arose.
II. Brown v. Lee
Both husband and wife died intestate and childless in the crash of
their private airplane, in circumstances giving rise to a conclusive
presumption of simultaneous death under the Texas simultaneous
death act.'" Four insurance policies, purchased with community
'Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874), first quoted in Martin v. McAllister,
94 Tex. 567, 568, 63 S.W. 624, 625 (1901), and in subsequent cases in accord therewith.
6Martin v. Moran, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 509, 32 S.W. 904, was decided in 1895; the
decision in Martin v. McAllister, 94 Tex. 567, 63 S.W. 624, was rendered in 1901.
155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956), noted in 10 Sw. L.J. 326 (1956), 35 Texas
L. Rev. 449 (1957). In this case husband and wife perished in a common disaster, although
the husband survived the wife by a few minutes. The wife was the beneficiary of three
policies on the husband's life that during marriage had been either maintained or purchased
with community funds. All of the proceeds were held to become the husband's separate
property because the proceeds rights only came into existence as property upon the husband's
death, which occurred after the dissolution of the community by the wife's death.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 23 (1) (1959); see Swift, supra note 1.
'This conclusion is particularly inescapable in view of the amendment's avowed purpose,
as stated in the statute's emergency clause: "Warthan v. Haynes . . . casts some doubt on
the status of life insurance policies as property . . ." Huie, op. cit. supra note 1, 2 Business
& Family Planning at 126.
5
°Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 47(b) (1956) reads as follows:
When a husband and wife have died, leaving community property, and there
is no direct evidence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously, one-
half of all community property shall be distributed as if the husband had
survived, and the other one-half thereof shall be distributed as if the wife
had survived, except as provided in Subsection (e) of this Section.
Consider also Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 47(a) (1956):
When the title to property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority
of death and there is no direct evidence that persons have died otherwise
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funds, were in force on the husband's life. The wife was the primary
and only beneficiary of each policy. The common administrator
divided all policy proceeds equally between the spouses' respective
estates. On motion of the husband-insured's heirs, the probate court
awarded all of the proceeds to the estate of the husband-insured. On
appeal the district court reinstated the common administrator's de-
termination of equal division. The court of civil appeals affirmed."
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that although
the proceeds are community property, the husband-insured's estate
is entitled to all of the proceeds. The wife-beneficiary is deemed to
have predeceased the husband-insured;" therefore, one-half of the
proceeds, as community property, passes initially to the estate of each
spouse. But the wife-beneficiary's one-half of the proceeds then
passes to the husband-insured's estate because the husband, as the
presumed community survivor, becomes the wife's heir under the
applicable statute of descent and distribution." Brown v. Lee,
- Tex. -, 371 S.W.2d 694 (1963).
Significantly, the instant decision recognizes the plain effect of the
1957 amendment-that the right to the proceeds from a life insur-
ance policy prior to its maturity is property. 4 Otherwise, Brown v.
Lee on its facts is merely one of simple statutory application. In the
comparatively rare situation in which both spouses simultaneously
perish intestate and childless and the life of one spouse is insured in
favor of the other spouse, section 47 (e) of the Texas Probate Code"
than simultaneously, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if he
had survived, except as provided otherwise in this Section.
No explanation has been found, nor can one be given, as to why the existence of this pro-
vision does not obviate the necessity for § 47(b). Both provisions appear in the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act, which Texas has adopted virtually verbatim. 9c Unif. Laws Ann.
157-58 (1953). But in Texas, perhaps unlike in some community property states, each spouse
has an equal, undivided, vested right in all community property from the moment of its
acquisition. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Rompel v. United States, 59 F. Supp.
483, 486-87 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 367' (1945). Therefore,
under § 47(a), "the property of each person" (spouse) should include a vested one-half
interest in the community estate, in addition to that spouse's separate property. Under this
provision, as under § 47(b), the community property of a spouse is disposed of as if he or
she survived. Thus, it would seem that the purpose of § 47(b) is already fulfilled by § 47(a).
'1 362 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), noted in 41 Texas L. Rev. 832 (1963).
"Such presumption arises under Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 47(e) (1956):
When the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life . . . insurance
have died and there is no direct evidence that they have died otherwise than
simultaneously, the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured
had survived the beneficiary.
1s Upon the dissolution of the marriage relation by death, all property belonging
to the community estate of the husband and wife shall go to the survivor, if
there be no child or children of the deceased or their descendants . ...
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45 (1956).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 23(1) (1959); see notes 8-9 supra and accompanying
text.
15 Quoted in note 12 supra.
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creates the conclusive presumption that the insured spouse survived
the beneficiary spouse. Such presumption of survivorship prevents
the completion of an attempted gift by the insured spouse to the
beneficiary spouse of his or her undivided one-half community inter-
est in the proceeds."6 Initially, therefore, the community one-half of
each spouse descends to his or her respective estate. But since the
same survivorship presumption controls for all purposes, 7 the insured
spouse is deemed the heir of the beneficiary spouse under the statute
of descent and distribution governing the community estate."' Thus,
in addition to the insured spouse's community one-half of the pro-
ceeds, the beneficiary spouse's community one-half of the pro-
ceeds passes to the insured spouse's separate estate. The reasoning and
the result of Brown v. Lee are consistent with decisions of other
community property jurisdictions in which the problem has arisen.19
In Brown v. Lee the court could have reached the same result
by other, less sound means. If the right to the proceeds had not been
recognized as community property, the husband-insured's estate also
would have realized all of the proceeds, but on the now overruled
1 In an interspousal insurance situation, only the insured spouse's one-half interest in the
proceeds is transferred to the beneficiary spouse, whose own one-half interest in the proceeds
remains vested. To acquire the insured spouse's one-half interest in addition to his or her
own one-half interest, therefore, the beneficiary spouse must survive or be presumed to sur-
vive the insured spouse. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 47(e) (1956).
17The language itself of § 47(e), see note 12 supra, extends the purpose of the sur-
vivorship presumption beyond merely defeating the beneficiary's rights to take as a bene-
ficiary, for it commands that "the proceeds . . . shall be distributed as if the insured had
survived . . ." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
If, contrary to the statutory terms, the court has restricted the application of the sur-
vivorship presumption merely to defeating the beneficiary's right, two alternatives would
have been available to the court. First, a result of equal division of the proceeds could have
been reached by engrafting a judicial amendment upon § 47(b) - contrary to its express
terms - so as to extend the scope of its application to insurance proceeds. In 1953 the Na-
tional Conference on Uniform State Laws proposed such an amendment to the counterpart
of S 47(e) in the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act for community property states. 9c Unif.
Laws Ann. 167-68 (1957); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Handbook 251 (1953). Texas has not enacted this amendment, which of itself substantiates
the conclusion that the survivorship presumption under § 47(e) controls for all purposes.
Second, if § 47(e) had been construed merely to defeat the right of the beneficiary,
the court could have held that § 47(b) is not applicable by its own terms. The heirs then
would have been relegated to the common law, which has no survivorship presumptions.
Paden v. Briscoe, 81 Tex. 563, 17 S.W. 42 (1891); Hildenbrant v. Ames, 66 S.W. 128
(Tex. Civ. App. 1901) error ref. As a practical matter, therefore, those heirs having the
burden of proof of survivorship would lose. See Note, 5 Baylor L. Rev. 105 (1952). Such
a construction, however, would particularly frustrate the very purpose of the simultaneous
death act: to provide presumptions of survivorship in situations in which the devolution of
property depends upon the unascertainable priority of death. Ibid.
"sTex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45 (1956).
'0 In re Wedemeyer's Estate, 109 Cal. App. 2d 67, 240 P.2d 8 (Dist. Ct. App. 1952);
Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12, 21-22 (1956); Succession of Farrell, 200
La. 29, 7 So. 2d 605 (1942); In re Miller, 44 N.M. 214, 100 P.2d 908 (1940); Saunders
v. Majors, 51 Wash. 2d 274, 317 P.2d 528 (1957).
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reasoning of Warthan v. Haynes."s Similarly, an identical result
would have resulted if section 47(e) of the Texas Probate Code'
had been construed as a statute of descent and distribution-which
it clearly is not-instead of as a mere survivorship statute."2
III. EFFECTS OF THE INSTANT DECISION
In Brown v. Lee the Texas Supreme Court resolves the uncertainty
as to the property status of life insurance proceeds rights. It is now
certain that the 1957 amendment" defining life insurance as property
overrules the rationale of Warthan v. Haynes and its predecessors. 4
Henceforth, the right to the proceeds will be recognized as property
prior to the maturity of the policy. If a policy insuring the life of
a spouse is purchased with community funds, the right to the pro-
ceeds therefrom will be community property." By designating a
revocable beneficiary" of a life insurance policy, the husband, as
20 155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956). All of the proceeds would have passed to the
husband's separate estate because the proceeds would have come into existence only upon
the presumed subsequent death of the husband, after the community had been dissolved by
the death of the wife. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
"5 Quoted in note 12 supra.
22 Section 47(e) merely commands that "the proceeds . . . shall be distributed as it
." (Emphasis added.) It does not direct the manner in which the proceeds shall actually
be distributed, which is the purpose of a statute of descent and distribution. By its own
terms, this provision supplies only a presumption of survivorship, which in intestate situ-
ations serves as the underpinning for the operation of the applicable statute of descent and
distribution-in the instant case, Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45 (1956).
Of course, if in the instant case the wife-beneficiary had died testate, her community
one-half of the proceeds would have passed to the designated legatees. Similarly, if the wife
had died intestate but had been survived by children or their descendants, her community
one-half of the proceeds would have passed to those individuals. Ibid.
"aTex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 23(1) (1959).
1
4 Warthan v. Haynes, 155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956); see notes 4, 7 supra.
as The separate or community character of property acquired during marriage is de-
termined by the character of the consideration given in exchange for it. Love v. Robertson,
7 Tex. 6 (1851). Premiums paid for life insurance are considered a single, cumulative asset
and not a series of distinct, individual investments, each of which is consumed during its
respective premium period. See, e.g., Stapf v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 830, 833 (N.D.
Tex. 1960), modified on other grounds, 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); cf. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963). See also Huie, op. cit. supra note 1, 2 Business & Family Planning at 128.
"6 Throughout this Note it is assumed that the community receives no consideration for
designating the beneficiary of a community life insurance policy, a situation beyond the
scope of this Note. It is also assumed, if not expressly mentioned, that the beneficiary has
been revocably designated, as is the usual situation. An irrevocable beneficiary has an ab-
solutely vested right to the proceeds of a life insurance policy from the moment of his
designation; neither the community nor its creditors can impair this right without the
beneficiary's consent. Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888); Evans v. Opperman, 76
Tex. 293, 13 S.W. 312 (1890); 2 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 901-02, 911,
921 (1943); 12 id. at § 7007. The same is true if the right to change the beneficiary is
not reserved in the policy. McNeill v. Chinn, 101 S.W. 465, 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907);
Huebner, Life Insurance 300 (5th ed. 1959). For federal gift taxation purposes, the designa-
tion of an irrevocable beneficiary constitutes a taxable gift of the policy proceeds right. See
note 45 infra.
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manager of the community, 27 transfers an expectancy in the com-
munity right to the proceeds s. 2  The community retains ownership of
the policy, including the right to change the beneficiary and to cause
the policy to lapse; thus, the completion of the gift of the proceeds
right is dependent upon the nonexercise or limited exercise of the
various incidents of ownership prior to the death of the insured
spouse.
To be sure, the implications of Brown v. Lee are more significant
than its immediate practical effect, which is limited to certain inter-
spousal insurance situations. The beneficiary of a policy on the life
27 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960). Save for the homestead, the managerial
power of the husband over the community is virtually unlimited, except that he cannot
dispose of community property in such a way as to perpetrate an actual or constructive
fraud upon the wife's rights. Kemp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 205 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1953), remanding to the district court, whose opinion was affirmed in 220 F.2d 952 (5th
Cir. 1955); Volunteer State Life Ins. Co. v. Hardin, 145 Tex. 245, 197 S.W.2d 105 (1946);
see Huie, op. cit. supra note 1, 2 Business & Family Planning at 116-17, 136-38. The possible
effect of the 1963 amendment to article 4614, with respect to management of the wife's spe-
cial community, is beyond the scope of this Note. For an analysis of the 1963 amendment,
see Smith, Legislative Note: 1963 Amendments Affecting Married Women's Rights in Texas,
18 Sw. L.J. 70 (1963). As to certain interspousal problems rooted in the husband's power
over the community, see note 46 infra and accompanying text.
" The weight of authority holds that a revocable beneficiary has only an expectancy
in a life insurance policy prior to its maturity; upon maturity the beneficiary acquires an
absolute, vested right to the proceeds. It follows that until the policy matures, such right
remains in the insured in a common-law state or in the community in a community property
state. Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Behrend, 247 U.S. 394, 398-99 (1918);
Zolintakis v. Orfanos, 119 F.2d 571, 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630
(1941); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Cole, 195 F. Supp. 867, 870-71 (E.D. Mo. 1961);
United Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Farr, 60 F. Supp. 829, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Sieroty v.
Silver, 58 Cal. 2d 799, 376 P.2d 563, 566 (1962); Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 268
Ill. App. 518, aff'd, 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250, 253 (1934); Bourne v. Haynes, - Misc.
2d -, 235 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Whitelaw v. Whitelaw, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 11,
113 N.E.2d 105, 107 (1952). Texas is in accord with the weight of authority. Fidelity
Union Life Ins. Co. v. Methven, 162 Tex. 319, 346 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1961); Scherer v.
Wahlstrom, 318 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref.; but cf. Simmons v.
Simmons, 272 S.W.2d 913, 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (revocable beneficiary held to have
"contingent interest" in policy prior to maturity). It would seem that the instant case
reaffirms Texas' adherence to this position: "When purchased with community funds, the
ownership of the unmatured chose logically belongs to the community, unless it has been
irrevocably given away. . . .The proceeds at maturity are likewise community in character,
except where the named beneficiary is in fact surviving, in which case a gift of the policy
rights to such beneficiary is . . . completed by the death of the insured." Brown v. Lee,
__ Tex. -, 371 S.W.2d 694, 696 (1963).
But there is a substantial minority position that a beneficiary has a vested interest subject
to divestment by the insured's act before the policy matures. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Connelly, 188 F.2d 462, 464-65 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v. Burgo, 175 F.2d 196,
197-98 (3d Cir. 1949) (New Jersey law); United States v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
127 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1942); Parks' Ex'rs v. Parks, 288 Ky. 435, 156 S.W.2d 480,
483 (1941); Taylor v. Sanderson, 330 Mass. 616, 116 N.E.2d 269, 271 (1953) ("qualified
vested interest"); Strohlsahl v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 71 N.J. Super.
300, 176 A.2d 814, 816 (Ch. 1962). If the liberty of the insured to change the beneficiary
may be considered a power, it would seem that the minority position is well founded, for
"a power is . . .an authority which operates upon .. . a vested interest, not being derived
out of such . . . interest but . . . superseding it." Burlington County Trust Co. v.
Di Castelcicala, 2 N.J. 214, 66 A.2d 164, 168 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
2"As to the various incidents of ownership of a life insurance policy, see note 2 supra.
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of a spouse will continue to receive the proceeds therefrom if he or
she in fact survives the insured spouse. Henceforth, however, such
proceeds will be realized by the beneficiary from an expectancy
acquired from the community when that individual is originally
designated the beneficiary; the death of the insured spouse will trans-
form the beneficiary's expectancy in the proceeds into an absolute,
vested right thereto."
A. Substantive Law
Only in the rare situation of simultaneous death of the insured
spouse and the beneficiary does Brown v. Lee effect a change in sub-
stantive law.a" In that event the expectancy in the proceeds of the
beneficiary, whether a third party or the other spouse, is defeated by
his or her conclusively presumed predecease." Assuming no alterna-
tive beneficiary has been named, the proceeds right, therefore, vests
absolutely in the community. Upon the maturity of this right by
the insured spouse's death, the proceeds themselves go to the com-
munity estate. At least initially, the proceeds then pass equally to
the estate of the insured spouse and to the other spouse or his or her
estate." However, if the insured spouse dies intestate and childless in
a third party beneficiary situation," the surviving spouse, as an heir,
S0 See note 28 supra.
3' Previously, in an interspousal-simultaneous death situation in which no alternative
beneficiary had been named, all of the proceeds would have passed to the insured spouse's
estate on the ground that the proceeds right became property only upon the insured spouse's
death, which would be deemed to occur after the dissolution of the community under the
survivorship presumption of Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 47(e) (1956). See Warthan v. Haynes,
155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956); see note 7 supra. Presumably, the same result also
would have been reached under the non-property theory in a situation in which the insured
spouse and a third-party beneficiary perished simultaneously. See note 4 supra and accom-
panying text.
It must be emphasized that in the instant case the estate of the insured spouse acquired
all of the proceeds only because the beneficiary spouse died intestate and childless; otherwise
the proceeds would have been equally divided between the spouses' respective estates.
32 See note 12 supra and accompanying text. Today virtually all life insurance contracts
contain a "reverter clause," which provides for the vesting of the beneficiary's interest
(whether revocable or irrevocable) in the insured if the beneficiary predeceases the insured.
Huebner, op. cit. supra note 26, at 306. It follows, therefore, that the beneficiary must
either survive or be presumed to survive the insured in order to take under the policy.
" This result follows from the general principle of equal division of the community
upon its dissolution since each spouse owns an undivided one-half of the community. Forrest
v. Moreno, 161 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref.; Kreis v. Kreis, 36 S.W.2d
821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) error dism.
"'Technically speaking, every beneficiary of a life insurance policy is a "third party
beneficiary" in ordinary contract law, for the parties to the contract are the insurer and the
insured or the original owner; by their actions a benefit may be conferred upon the bene-
ficiary. Shaw v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 120 Conn. 633, 182 At. 472 (1936); 2
Williston, Contracts §§ 356, 369 (3d ed. 1959); Dechert, Beneficiary Clauses and Their
Legal Implications, in The Life Insurance Policy Contract 83 (Waggoner & Krueger eds.
1953). In the interest of clarity, however, "third party beneficiary" is used here to refer
to a beneficiary other than either spouse or his or her estate.
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will take the insured spouse's community one-half of the proceeds."
Similarly, if the beneficiary spouse dies intestate and childless in an
interspousal insurance situation, the beneficiary spouse's community
one-half will pass to the estate of the insured spouse as the heir of the
beneficiary spouse."
B. Federal Estate Taxation
In addition Brown v. Lee buttresses the current federal estate
taxation policy of including in the estate of a deceased insured spouse
only one-half of the value of the proceeds from a policy purchased
with community funds." As a result of Warthan v. Haynes," the
Commissioner could have logically argued for the inclusion of all of
the proceeds in the estate of the deceased insured spouse, for under
the non-property rationale of that case, all of the proceeds directly
became the property of the insured spouse's separate estate if the
insured spouse survived or was presumed to survive the beneficiary."'
Since the right to the proceeds is now definitely established to be com-
munity property, Texas property law will be entirely consonant with
federal revenue practice, the operation of which is based upon local
law.'
In all other taxation aspects, the recognition that the proceeds
right of a community life insurance policy is property prior to
maturity does not prejudice the position of a taxpayer in a commu-
nity property state; the revenue law remains the same. By designating
"s Since an attempted gift of the community proceeds fails by the presumed predecease
of the third party beneficiary, the proceeds remain in the community estate. One-half of the
community estate goes to the surviving spouse because the death of the insured spouse dis-
solves the community. As the insured spouse's heir, the surviving spouse in addition takes
the insured spouse's one-half of the community estate. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45 (1956).
as Because the beneficiary spouse is presumed to have predeceased the insured spouse under
47(e), the insured spouse becomes the beneficiary spouse's heir under § 45. As such, both
the insured spouse's one-half of the community estate and the beneficiary spouse's one-half
pass to the separate estate of the insured spouse.
",Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
259 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); De Lappe v.
Commissioner, 113 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1940); Doyle v. Thomas, 30 A.F.T.R. 1591 (N.D.
Tex. 1942); Townsend v. Thomas, 30 A.F.T.R. 1534 (N.D. Tex. 1942); Estate of Moody,
42 B.T.A. 987 (1940); Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(b) (1958); Rev. Rul. 48, 1953-1 Cum.
Bull. 392; CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. 5 1310.
as 155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481 (1956). See note 7 supra.
39 See note 7 supra. It follows, therefore, that the wife has no vested interest in the
proceeds under this theory. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. Property in which the
wife has no vested interest under state law is considered to be the husband's separate prop-
erty for estate taxation purposes. Talcott v. United States, 23 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 277 U.S. 604 (1928); Hall, op. cit. supra note 1, at 68; see Swift, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 692, 721.
4'Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 46-47, 52-53, 56-57 (1944); Hopkins v.
Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1930); Commissioner
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 249 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913
(1959); Treas. Reg. S 20.2042-1 (b) (2) (1958); see Morrison, Life Insurance-Tax Aspects,
in Texas Institutes, 2 Business & Family Planning 142, 143-48 (1957).
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a revocable beneficiary, the husband, as manager of the community,4'
parts with no control over the proceeds right, which remains in the
community; at any subsequent time he is free to name another bene-
ficiary. For gift taxation purposes, therefore, such designation of a
beneficiary is an incomplete transfer of the proceeds right and hence
not taxable.4" Only upon the death of the insured spouse is the trans-
fer completed. At that time one-half of the proceeds is included in
the insured spouse's estate. 3 If the surviving spouse is the bene-
ficiary, there are no additional taxation consequences because a com-
pleted transfer of only the insured spouse's one-half interest in the
proceeds is effected by his or her death." If the beneficiary is a third
party, however, the insured spouse's death also completes a transfer
of the surviving spouse's one-half interest in the proceeds, which
transfer constitutes a taxable gift as to the surviving spouse.4"
C. Problems
At least two major problems may arise in the operation of the
theory of Brown v. Lee. First, inherent in the recognition of the
proceeds right as property is the necessity in certain interspousal situa-
tions of implying a gift of one spouse's community proceeds interest
in order to effectuate completely a designation of the other spouse
as beneficiary.4 The recent decision of Moss v. Gibbs4' has emascu-
lated the theory of an implied gift of community property between
spouses, albeit in a creditors' rights situation. That case must be
restricted to its facts or otherwise reconciled with the import of
the instant decision.
41 See note 27 supra.
41 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. 5 3200.50.
43 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
" Since the surviving beneficiary spouse retains his or her vested community interest in
the proceeds, there can be no taxable transfer as to that one-half. Commissioner v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 252-55 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959);
see also Stapf v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 830, 833 (N.D. Tex. 1960), modified on other
grounds, 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 118 (1963); J.J.
Perkins, 1 T.C. 982 (1943); Rev. Rul. 48, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 392.
" Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 44, at 255; Treas. Reg. § 25.2511 -1
(h) (9) (1958). However, the designation of an irrevocable beneficiary is a completed trans-
fer from its inception and is taxable to the donor at that time. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1
(h) (8) (1958).
"' This problem will arise, for example, if the husband uses community funds to pur-
chase a policy on the wife's life and names himself the beneficiary (assuming the wife is
not thereby defrauded, see note 27 supra) ; or if the wife, lacking community managerial
capacity, purchases or names herself the beneficiary of a community policy on the husband's
life. To say that in these situations the wife acts either as an agent of the husband or as a
subagent of the community will not do, for the essence of an agency relationship, at least
as to its inception, is its consensual character.
47 Tex. -, 370 S.W.2d 452 (1963), noted in 15 Baylor L. Rev. 193 (1963) (mere
noninterference by the husband with the wife's business activities cannot establish a gift
of the husband's community interest in profits realized therefrom).
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Second, in certain insurance transactions in which the spouses are
found to have exchanged their property interests,'4 8 the recognition
of the proceeds right as property prior to maturity may conflict with
the rule of Hilley v. Hilley."9 Although its full impact is not pres-
ently known, Hilley v. Hilley at least holds that community prop-
erty cannot be transformed into a joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship without first complying with the applicable partition
statutes.' ° According to the Texas Supreme Court, in a situation in
which such a transformation is attempted, "there is no gift but an
attempted transfer of a survivorship right or interest from each
spouse to the other for a valuable consideration";" thus, the com-
munity property retains its character because under the Texas Con-
stitution"' and the applicable community property statutes,"' the
spouses lack the power to change community property into the
separate property of one spouse by a contract attempting to create
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship. A subsequent amendment
to section 46 of the Texas Probate Code 4 by its own terms over-
rules the Hilley case, but its constitutionality is questionable if
literally construed."
Although Hilley v. Hilley involved corporate stock, the decision
therein is written in such broad language that certain interspousal
life insurance transactions supported by consideration almost cer-
tainly will fall within its ban. Usually, the receipt by a beneficiary
other than the insured's estate of the proceeds from a life insurance
policy consummates a gift transaction, i.e., a voluntary transfer of
48 That is, in situations in which a valuable consideration is found to have been given.
49 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4624a (1960), 881a-23 (1953).
" Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).
5Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 4610 (1960), 4613 (1960), 4614 (1960), 4619
(1960), 4624a (1960), 881a-23 (1953).
" Where two . . . or more persons hold an estate . . . jointly, and one . . . joint
owner dies before severance, his interest in said joint estate shall not survive
to the remaining joint owner . . . but shall descend to, and be vested in, the
heirs or legal representatives of such deceased joint owner in the same manner
as if his interest had been severed and ascertained. Provided, however, that by
an agreement in writing of joint owners of property, the interest of any joint
owner who dies may be made to survive to the surviving joint owner ... . but
no such agreement shall be inferred from the mere fact that the property is
held in joint ownership. It is specifically provided that any husband and his
wife may, by written agreement, create a joint estate out of their community
property, with Yights of survivorship. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 46 (Supp. 1961)
(Emphasis on 1961 amendment added.)
" See Wren, Recent Texas Statutes Affecting Estate Planning, 15 Sw. L.J. 479 (1961);
Comment, Hailey, Hilley, and House Bill 670-A Study in Partition and Survivorship in
Texas Community Property, 15 Sw. L.J. 613 (1961).
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property free of any consideration."6 But, for example, if (1) com-
munity property is used to insure a third party's life in which the
community has an insurable interest, (2) one spouse is named pri-
mary beneficiary, and (3) the other spouse is designated alternative
beneficiary-undoubtedly a consideration-supported attempt to create
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship between the spouses will
be found; in that event the proceeds will become community prop-
erty unless the spouses previously effect a statutory partition of the
community property with which the policy is purchased and main-
tained." It is even possible that consideration will be held to exist
and that the same result will be reached if (1) insurance on one
spouse's life is purchased with community property, (2) the other
spouse is named primary beneficiary, and (3) the insured spouse's
estate is designated alternative beneficiary. The Hilley rule in general
can be criticized heavily and with good reason. More importantly,
its application to community property-life insurance situations cer-
tainly would produce ludicrous results.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Brown v. Lee the court correctly applied the relevant statutes,
including the 1957 amendment defining life insurance as property,"'
to reach a correct result on legally sound reasoning. Although the
instant case must be reconciled with Moss v. Gibbs" and Hilley v.
Hilley," it now makes solid the underpinning of Texas property law
for the application of the federal estate tax."1 But particularly de-
sirable is the holding that the right to the proceeds from a life
"In Hilley, the court does not quarrel with the observation in Edds v. Mitchell, 143
Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945), that "a life insurance policy is perhaps the best illustra-
tion of a contract for the benefit of a donee beneficiary ... " Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex.
569, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569-70 (1961). Rather it merely overrules Smith v. Ricks, 159 Tex.
280, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958), and rejects the analogy therein of the usual life insurance
policy to bonds purchased with community property in joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship. "The 'contract' which a purchaser of bonds makes with the government does
not simply provide that the securities shall become the property of the other co-owner at the
purchaser's death. It stipulates that if either co-owner dies, the surviving co-owner shall be
recognized as sole and absolute owner. This is nothing more than a survivorship agree-
ment. . . . Such an agreement when made is for the mutual benefit of the contracting parties,
and there is no semblance of a gift even though some third party may also agree to recog-
nize the survivor as absolute owner." Hilley v. Hilley, supra at 570. Hence, when the prob-
lematical language of Hilley is reasonably construed, it is apparent that the normal life
insurance situation falls outside of the scope of that decision. Here, as in other areas, the
wife's lack of capacity to manage the community may present problems. See note 46 supra
and accompanying text.
7 See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 23(1) (1959).
5- Tex. -, 370 S.W.2d 452 (1963); see note 47 supra and accompanying text.
60 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961); see note 49 supra and accompanying text.
61 See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
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insurance policy prior to maturity is property. Logically, it can-
not be deemed anything else." The proceeds right is inherent in
and the overriding purpose of the life insurance contract. Just as
the right to the principal of a promissory note at some future time,
it is unequivocally the present right to a sum certain payable in
the future under a contract; it is, therefore, in the nature of a
chose in action. But similar to a contingent reminder, the acquisi-
tion by the beneficiary of the proceeds under such right is both
indefinite in time and uncertain in occurrence. So long as the policy
is maintained, however, the proceeds right must exist somewhere. In
this regard, it is essential to distinguish between the property right
to the proceeds itself and the nature of the beneficiary's interest in
the proceeds prior to the maturity of a policy purchased with com-
munity funds. If the beneficiary has a mere expectancy-as ap-
parently he or she has in Texas -then of necessity the proceeds
right must remain in the community as the owner of the policy.
However, if the beneficiary's interest is a vested property right sub-
ject to divestment," the community will retain only a reversionary
interest in the proceeds. Perhaps the latter will prove to be the better
view of the beneficiary's interest in the proceeds because after desig-
nating a beneficiary the community" must take subsequent action
in some form to prevent the beneficiary from receiving the proceeds.
Regardless of whether held by the beneficiary or the community prior
to its maturity, certainly the proceeds right itself is a present prop-
erty right and not a mere expectancy.
Wallace M. Swanson
e There is virtual unanimity of authority in characterizing a life insurance policy in
its entirety as personal property in the nature of a chose in action arising out of a contract.
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 679-80 (1933); Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156
(1911); Griffin v. McCoach, 116 F.2d 261, 264 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 313
U.S. 498 (1940); Densby v. Acacia Mut. Life Ass'n, 78 F.2d 203, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1935);
Frick v. Lewellyn, 298 Fed. 803, 808-09 (W.D. Pa. 1924), aff'd, 268 U.S. 238 (1925); In
re Hamilton's Estate, 113 Colo. 141, 154 P.2d 1008, 1010-11 (1945); Milam v. Davis, 97
Fla. 916, 123 So. 668, 688, cert. denied sub nom., Tiffany & Co. v. Davis, 280 U.S. 601
(1929); Elliott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 116 Ind. App. 404, 64 N.E.2d 911, 917
(1946); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340, 342 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1946); Mondin v. Mondin, 274 App. Div. 69, 80 N.Y.S.2d 176, 180 (Sup. Ct.
1948); Cutter v. American Trust Co., 213 N.C. 686, 197 S.E. 542, 548 (1938); 12 Apple-
man, op. cit. supra note 26, at S 7007. Indeed, in the modern era it would seem that,
prior to Brown v. Lee, only Texas courts failed to recognize the proceeds right of a life
insurance policy as property prior to maturity.
3 See note 28 supra.
"Ibid.
ea Acting through its manager, the husband; see note 27 supra.
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